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The Candidates for Secretary of State: Where They Stand on Electronic Voting

Iowans for Voting Integrity recently sent a questionnaire to both the Democratic and Republican candidates for Iowa Secretary of State. We asked the candidates for their thoughts on seven questions of importance to the integrity of our voting systems. The text of the questions and the candidates responses answers are posted below.

The measure most basic to restoring trustworthiness to our voting systems is a voter-verified paper record of every vote, accompanied by random hand audits of the paper record. Both Democrat Michael Mauro and Republican Mary Ann Hanusa support a paper record and audits.  It is a hopeful sign that both major parties have fielded candidates who endorse this core element of election integrity in the age of electronic counting.

Mauro discusses in some detail the security vulnerabilities posed by access to the memory card on a voting machine. Hanusa sees the answer to security issues in a highly trained staff of election workers.

Hanusa and Mauro both see the Secretary of State's office as an essential resource in aiding county auditors and also providing oversight of the election process. Mauro is clearly troubled that Iowa counties must now rely on only two vendors, Diebold Election Systems and Election Systems and Software, and therefore sees the Secretary of State's office as having an added responsibility to ensure that vendors do right by their county customers.

Both candidates punted the question of whether of not voting-system software should be disclosed to the public. This is disappointing. Disclosure does not make software less secure. A majority of secure websites  use the Apache server, whose software is available to anyone who wants to read it.  The open-source Linux operating system  has achieved a security rating that makes it suitable for highly sensitive government operations. 

IVI advocates disclosed software, which would preserve the patents and copyrights of the voting machine companies' software, and, most importantly, keep that software accountable to the public.

Hanusa took a forceful stand against the risky practice of e-mail voting for overseas military personnel, while Mauro thought that every measure possible should be taken to allow soldiers access to voting. IVI opposes the state's plan for e-mail voting.

The candidates' answers are posted in full below. Iowans for Voting Integrity is nonpartisan and will therefore not be making an endorsement in this race. We offer this questionnaire to give Iowa voters a chance to examine the views of the candidates for the state's top job in election administration.


Questions for Candidates for Secretary of State


1.      What do you see as the biggest challenge for the next Iowa Secretary of State, with respect to administering elections?


Mary Ann Hanusa (R):        Balancing the public's desire to use available technology to generate fast and accurate election results with the need to generate complete confidence  in the entire election process. The voters need to be able to trust the technology, and part of this trust will be built on explaining why they can have confidence in the particular system they are using, in particular, what safeguards are in place to ensure accuracy and fairness.

Michael Mauro (D):      There are many challenges facing the next Secretary of State. The implications of policy decisions made with the Help America Vote Act (H.A.V.A), have changed the requirements of the office across the country. The biggest challenges lie with the election equipment and additional human capital to support the equipment. If elected Secretary of State, I think it is important to maintain the integrity of our elections by making sure every vote counts. I also want to make voting efficient, easy and accessible for all eligible Iowans.


2.      A recent Princeton University study[1] found that Diebold TS touch screen machines were vulnerable to dangerous security attacks. To quote, "malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates." These machines are close cousins of the TSx machines being used in Iowa.  What are your views on the use of these machines?
             
Mauro:      This is a great question and it is imperative to understand the facts and then focus on the policy decisions that need to be implemented to ensure the integrity of our voting system. First, we must require a paper trail regardless of the equipment that is used. Without a paper trail any manipulations of the system will go unidentified.

Princeton computer professor, Edward W. Felten, wrote in his paper, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," that there are real dangers of the election system being hacked by simply accessing a machine's memory card. This type of manipulation of the system is a reality in this day in age and should be planned for in case such an atrocity occurs. Paper trails are the best way to catch any manipulation of the system. Electron Diebold Voting Machines cannot be used without paper trails due to the many security risks that exist according to Felten's paper. Whether the Diebold Voting Machine or an optical scanner is used, a paper trail is necessary so the voter can confirm their choices. As with everything, there is always human error, but by requiring people to review their ballots, it ensures that any mistakes that occurred, any manipulations of the system, or any irregular occurrences will be identified and dealt with almost immediately.
 

Hanusa:     The key to continuing to use existing machines is limiting the access (other than to voters) to a trained, technically savvy, and vigilant staff who can maintain and monitor the machines, and so prevent misuse.


3.      With the advent of new electronic voting equipment, auditors and other elections officials have become increasingly reliant on the private sector to supply the machines, the training, the technical support, and often the ballot configuration files. Do you feel this is a satisfactory situation, and if not, what can be done to improve it?
             
Hanusa:     We have relied on contractors and vendors from private companies for many years. The source of the voting equipment is not so much the issue as is its use.  County auditors should be assisted by the Secretary of State's office to make sure procedures are proper and that there is careful oversight by the local election officials in the process.  Trained and vigilant election workers are key.

Mauro:     Currently there are two vendors that provide equipment and ballots to County Auditors in the State of Iowa. This makes it very difficult for these auditors to maintain control over expectations because the competition is so limited.

During the current election cycle there were roughly 20 counties that did not receive their ballots on time due to delays from the vendors. I plan to require state level contract provisions that would grant the auditors more authority over their own election operations. These contract requirements would require companies to deliver ballots on time, meet statewide standards and laws, and ensure that there would be uniformity of performance across the state and that county auditors would not be at the mercy of a small number of vendors.

Since elections officials are more reliant on these private sector entities to supply the machines, the training, technical support and in some cases the ballot configuration files, it is imperative that we hold these companies to high statewide accepted standards to ensure that the integrity of our election process in the State of Iowa remains intact .



 4.      Proposed federal legislation (HR 550, the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act) would require random audits of two percent of precincts, to validate that votes are being accurately counted electronically. Would you support a similar measure at the state level?

Mauro:     I fully support H.R . 550 because it amends the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require a voter-verified permanent paper trail. I support anything that helps to ensure the security and integrity of the process. Most importantly, I believe testing needs to occur prior the election, including sign offs and certifications from election personnel managing the election process. All testing certifications should be should be made available to the public for inspection.
 
Hanusa:     Yes.

 
5.      Currently, voting machine software is a proprietary secret, and cannot be examined—even by elections officials. The only examination of software is by the Independent Testing Authorities, which are selected and paid for by the vendors and therefore may have a conflict of interest. Leading computer science experts and voting integrity groups are calling for public disclosure of voting machine software, which would still preserve patent and copyright protection. Where do you stand on this issue?

Hanusa:     The public disclosure of software, while still preserving patent and copyright protection, is not always possible, and may not be desirable.  Making software used in electronic voting systems available to the public would make it easier for hackers to write harmful viruses and other malicious programs.  Careful review and continued discussion of this issue is necessary.  The sort of checking processes called for in HR550 may help here.

Mauro:     This is another reason why paper trail is imperative.


6.      The DRE touchscreens were advanced by HAVA in the interest of making the voting process accessible to citizens with impaired physical or visual abilities. Given the existence of alternative equipment for accessible voting that is based on a paper ballot (such as Ballot Marking Devices or the Vote-PAD system) do you see any need to abandon paper-based voting to accommodate the disabled?
       
Mauro:     No I do not. Currently in Polk County people with disabilities us the automark machine, which still provides a paper trail. The abandonment of a paper trail does not need to occur to accommodate the disabled. The integrity of the system should be maintained for every voter and requiring a paper trail is the only method to do this

Hanusa:     No.

7.      Iowa recently announced a program for email voting for overseas military personnel. In this plan, voters sacrifice the secrecy of their ballot. In 2004, a similar Pentagon plan was roundly criticized by voting security experts[2]. What is your view of email voting?

 
Hanusa:   E-mail voting sacrifices the secrecy of the ballot(s), and also has the potential for misuse, manipulation, and other types of fraudulent     activities.  The current technology is not yet sufficient to supply the level of confidence and security that voters need for elections, but as technology changes, further review and consideration should be given to this matter.

I believe that measures should be taken to ensure that our overseas military personnel are not disenfranchised because of their service to our Nation.

Mauro:     The implementation of this process is an additional option for overseas military personnel who are burdened by location and military duty and may not have adequate access to normal absentee processes. As Secretary of State I will continue to encourage every Iowan overseas to use normal absentee methods to ensure ballot secrecy, however when service men and women located in combat zones lack the ability to request the normal process, these individuals deserve additional access to the fundamental right of voting.



                [1] Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, September 13, 2006, by Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten, available online at http://itpolicy. princeton. edu/voting/ ts-paper. pdf

            [2]A security analysis of the secure electronic registration and voting experiment (SERVE), January 20, 2004, by David Jefferson, Aviel Rubin, Barbara Simons, and David Wagner, available online at http://servesecurit yreport.org/