Use of DREs in Iowa’s 2006 Primary Election

Prepared by Carole Simmons, Ph.D.

Print Version (Word file)

Background: Our main objective in doing this survey was to determine what percentage of Iowa voters used a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) touchscreen in the June 2006 primary. Each county in Iowa uses one of the following three types of voting systems at its polling places:

DREs only (other than absentee ballots).
A blend of paper ballots and DREs. Voters may opt to use either type of system.
Paper ballots only. Ballots are counted by Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS), and Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs) are used for accessibility.

Methods and Results: Three types of survey questions and responses were used, to match the voting system of each county in question. The survey was conducted by email, with the exception of a small number of counties contacted by telephone.

For the 19 counties using only DREs, we asked

How many voters took part in the primary in your county?
How many absentee ballots were cast?
Were the absentee ballots counted by a scanner, by DRE, or by hand?

We had responses from ten of these counties. In Clayton County, absentee ballots were counted on DREs; we considered these to be votes on a DRE. All other nine counties used a scanner to count their absentee ballots. Averaging across the ten counties, the DRE usage rate was 90 percent. (The nine counties missing are Appanoose, Clay, Fayette, Jackson, Keokuk, Lucas, Plymouth, Warren, and Wayne.)

DRE/DRE Cos.	#Absentee	#DRE	Total	%DRE	notes
Poweshiek	310	1342	1652	81%
Union	205	983	1188	83%
Monroe	118	568	686	83%
Ringgold	95	716	811	88%
Mahaska	143	1123	1266	89%
Mitchell	71	691	762	91%
Marion	113	1484	1597	93%
Winnebago	39	732	771	95%
Worth	18	517	535	97%
Clayton	(225)	1775	1775	100%	225 absentee ballots counted on DRE
		9931	11043	90%

Table 1. Data for DRE-only Counties

In the 59 Blended counties using Optical Scan and DREs, we asked for the total numbers who voted using 1) paper ballots, and 2) DRE touchscreen machines. We had responses from 43 of these counties. Table 2 presents data for these counties, arranged in order of DRE usage rate. As can be seen, this rate varied widely from county to county, from a low of 1.7 percent to a high of 74.9 percent.

County	No. Paper	No. DRE	Total	%DRE
Scott	13928	236	14164	1.7%
Audubon	604	19	623	3.0%
Decatur	773	40	813	4.9%
Dickinson	1195	68	1263	5.4%
Mills	1147	80	1227	6.5%
Lee	2766	250	3016	8.3%
Winneshiek	2554	274	2828	9.7%
Ida	692	75	767	9.8%
Des Moines	3299	432	3731	11.6%
Jefferson	961	135	1096	12.3%
Linn	10533	1627	12160	13.4%
Johnson	9564	2342	11906	19.7%
Cherokee	736	189	925	20.4%
Black Hawk	8204	2330	10534	22.1%
Clarke	411	197	608	32.4%
Clinton	1925	996	2921	34.1%
Madison	1167	634	1801	35.2%
Davis	635	376	1011	37.2%
Page	429	388	817	47.5%
Sioux	2364	2146	4510	47.6%
Howard	349	317	666	47.6%
Shelby	330	310	640	48.4%
Bremer	1257	1250	2507	49.9%
Adair	406	412	818	50.4%
Floyd	366	398	764	52.1%
Montgomery	410	451	861	52.4%
Washington	809	900	1709	52.7%
Buchanan	954	1090	2044	53.3%
Carroll	843	979	1822	53.7%
O'Brien	313	408	721	56.6%
Iowa	626	853	1479	57.7%
Guthrie	346	535	881	60.7%
Hamilton	386	599	985	60.8%
Fremont	331	516	847	60.9%
Taylor	197	315	512	61.5%
Monona	263	421	684	61.5%
Cedar	384	640	1024	62.5%
Osceola	357	597	954	62.6%
Boone	553	1033	1586	65.1%
Humboldt	325	705	1030	68.4%
Pocahontas	137	310	447	69.4%
Franklin	449	1104	1553	71.1%
Emmet	120	358	478	74.9%
	74398	27335	101733	26.9%

Table 2. Data for Blended-System Counties.

Averaged across these 43 counties, the DRE usage rate was 27 percent. (We did not have responses from the following 16 blended counties: Adams, Allamakee, Benton, Cass, Chickasaw, Crawford, Dubuque, Greene, Harrison, Henry, Jasper, Lyon, Palo Alto, Sac, Story, and Wright.)

We were interested in a possible relationship between the size of the county and the DRE usage rate. In fact, the largest county (Scott) had the lowest DRE usage (1.7 percent), and the next three largest were also in the lower range. However, as can be seen in the scatter plot in Figure 1, among counties with fewer than 5,000 voters, there was no correlation between size and DRE usage rate.

In the 21 counties using paper ballots with PCOS, we asked for (1) the total number who voted in the primary, and (2) an estimate of how many voters used the BMD. Seven counties responded, as seen in Table 3. (The other 14 “all-paper” counties are Butler, Calhoun, Dallas, Delaware, Grundy, Hardin, Kossuth, Louisa, Marshall, Pottawattamie, Tama, Van Buren, Wapello, and Woodbury.)

County	Total Voters	Reported No. BMD users	Best estimate of BMD use
Buena Vista	1777	“May have been higher than other counties”	Unreported
Cerro Gordo	1759	5-10 %	7.5 %
Hancock	1121	10	0.9 %
Jones	1414	25	1.8 %
Muscatine	1691	“not very many”	Unreported
Polk	33252	60-70	0.2 %
Webster	4187	50-100	1.8 %

Table 3. Data for “all paper” counties (PCOS plus Ballot Marking Device)

We find it interesting to compare the high usage rate (27%) for the “accessible” DREs in blended counties vs. these very low usage rates for the BMD accessible system. Clearly most voters using the DREs are not doing so because of accessibility needs.

Estimating the Statewide DRE-Usage Rate

Ideally, we would know the total number of voters in each county. As a proxy for this, we used the total number of voters who voted for Governor, on either the Republican or Democratic ballot. As some voters did not vote for anyone in the governor’s race, this number is slightly lower than the total number, but relatively unbiased from county to county.

To estimate the number of voters using DREs statewide, we first added the number of voters in each of the three categories: paper-only, blended, or DRE-only. We took these category totals and multiplied them by the average DRE rate for that category, as follows:

Type of System	No. Counties	No. Voters	DRE usage rate	No. DRE voters
Paper OS-BMD	21	70,860	0	0
Blend OS-DRE	59	126,952	27%	34,277
DRE-only	19	24,091	90%	21,682
Totals	99	221,903		55,959

Table 4. Estimation of statewide DRE usage.

We calculate the statewide DRE usage rate at 25.2 percent by dividing the total number of DRE voters (55,959) by the total number of voters (221,903).

Finally, we note that if all voters in the blended counties had opted to vote using Paper Ballots/Optical Scan rather than DRE, the statewide DRE usage would instead have been 9.7 percent.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In a recent report on electronic voting[1], Iowa is listed in the category “high risk for compromised elections” due to its use of DREs with no voter-verified paper ballot. The present finding that a substantial portion of votes were cast on these unverifiable and unrecountable machines confirms this risk. Clearly, Iowa voters are unaware of the disadvantages of using a DRE touchscreen. Also, it is clear from the patterns of DRE use in small counties—as well as from anecdotal reports—that use of DREs was in many cases promoted by pollworkers who encouraged voters to try the new machines.

1. IVI urges elections officials in blended system counties to instruct pollworkers not to advertise or promote the use of DREs to incoming voters. Simply hand each voter a paper ballot, unless he or she requests to use the DRE.

2. In addition, there is an immediate need for public education. Voters should understand that using a DRE, they never see their actual ballot. The “Confirmation Screen” which appears on the touchscreen prior to casting of the ballot appears to be their voted ballot, but is in fact only displaying information in a temporary buffer. There is no certainty that when the voter presses the “Cast Ballot” button, the votes will be correctly transmitted and encoded into computer code. If there has been an error in the ballot configuration programming, votes could go to the wrong candidates and there would be no way to detect this.

3. Iowa needs new legislation mandating voter-verified paper ballots. Numerous computer security experts and studies have concluded that VVPB are the first requirement for a secure voting system with checks-and-balances.

[1] Election Reform Malfunction and Malfeasance: A Report on the Electronic Voting Machine Debacle. Common Cause, Washington DC, 2006, available at www.commoncause.org.